《THE FACES OF POWER CONSTANCY AND CHANGE IN UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY FROM TRUMAN TO REAGAN》

Introduction1

PART I.THE SOURCES AND LIMITS OF CONSTANGY5

1. The irreducible National Interest and Basic Premises About World Conditions7

2. Moral Purposes and the Balance-of-Power Consideration15

PART II.THE TRUMAN ADMINISTRATION27

3. The Shattering of Expectations29

4. 1948-1950: Internal Dialogue on the Components of the Balance of Power45

5. The Primacy of Balance-of-Power Considerations During the Korean War52

PART III.THE EISENHOWER ERA63

6. A New Look for Less Expensive Power65

7. Commitments and Coercion: Dulles' Psychology of Power76

8. Waging Peace: The Eisenhower Face86

9. Complicating the Premises: Suez and Hungary99

10. Sputnik: New Attention to Material Factors of Power113

11. Conditioned Responses to New Challenges121

PART IV. THE KENNEDY--JOHNSON YEARS147

12. Perceived Deficiencies in the Nation's Power149

13. Attending to the Military Balance160

14. New Tools for the New Arena: Opportunities and Obstacles181

15. Castro, Laos, the Congo: Limits on the Coercive Power of the Superpowers200

16. Berlin and Cuban Missiles: Defining Spheres of Control222

17. The-Test Ban: Stabilizing the Balance242

18. The Breakup of Blocs: The Decline of Ideology and Control259

19. The Vietnam and the Dominican Interventions278

20. The Disintegration of the Foreign Policy Consensus307

PART V. STATECRAFT UNDER N IXON AND FORD319

21. Kissinger and the Crises of Power321

22. The Insufficiency of Military Containment335

23. Avoiding Humiliation in Indochina360

24. The Middle East and the Reassertion of American Competence Abroad382

25. The Anachronism of Conservative Realpolitik441

26. The Kissinger Contribution441

PART VI. THE CARTER PERIOD449

27. The Many Faces of Jimmy Carter451

28. Idealism as the Higher Realism464

29. Camp David: The Extent and Limits of U.S. Leverage in the Middle East482

30. Hostages in Iran: Paralysis and Prudence in the Use of American Power504

31. SALT vs. Moving Beyond "MAD"535

32. Afghanistan and the Reassertion of Geopolitical Imperatives552

PART VII. THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION565

33. The Not-So-Grand Strategy of the Reagan Administration567

34. Ideology vs. the Real World603

Notes629

Index659