《LAW LANGUAGE AND LEGAL DETERMINACY》

INTRODUCTION1

Language and Law1

Interpretation in Context2

Language and Context4

An Overview6

1. H. L. A. HART AND THE 'OPEN TEXTURE' OF LANGUAGE7

Hart's Discussion of 'Open Texture'7

Waismann's Discussion of 'Open Texture'10

Waismann and Wittgenstein14

Hart on 'Open Texture'-Revisited17

'Open Texture' and Judicial Discretion18

Hart on 'Open Texture'-In Conclusion22

'Gaps', 'Extra-Legal Sources', and Discretion25

An Overview of the Critics28

2. THE APPLICATION (AND MIS-APPLICATION) OF WITTGENSTEIN'S RULE-FOLLOWING CONSIDERATIONS TO LEGAL THEORY36

Introduction36

The Rule-Following Considerations-A Summary38

Disagreement and 'Forms of Life'41

Over-Readings of Wittgenstein I: Langille45

Over-Readings of Wittgenstein II: Patterson50

Hard Cases and 'Contested Concepts'53

Concepts and Conceptions59

Conclusion61

3. CLEAR CASES63

The Idea of Easy Cases63

Language and Discourse71

Language and Dialect73

Conclusion76

4. RONALD DWORKIN'S RIGHT ANSWER THESIS77

Introduction77

The Concept of 'Right Answers'78

The Scope of a Right Answer Thesis88

Incommensurability96

Interpretation and Disagreement106

Interpretation and Consensus111

Different Perspectives in Law118

The Role of 'Purpose'120

Intention and Interpretation129

Conclusion131

5. MICHAEL MOORE'S METAPHYSICAL REALISM133

Introduction133

Metaphysical Realism134

Summary of Moore's Position137

The Problem About 'Death'140

Changing Beliefs and Changed Concepts146

Wittgenstein's Critique of Metaphysical Realism148

Moore's Project: A Second Look151

Two Additional Criticisms154

Summary of Brink's Position157

Criticism of Brink160

The Kripke-Putnam Theory of Reference162

A Further Look at Natural Kinds168

Alternatives to Natural-Kinds Analysis171

Response to Moore174

Conclusion176

6. A SUMMING-UP178

Introduction178

Threads in the Rope178

On Intention in Law183

The Meaning of 'Law'190

The Status of the Claims and the Temptation of Relativism195

Bibliography199

Index217