《The Rational As Reasonable》

CHAPTER Ⅰ: INTRODUCTION1

1. The Point of Departure1

1.1. The Routine Cases and the Hard Cases1

1.2. The Dilemma of the Decision-Maker3

1.3. On the Responsibility to Justify the Decisions5

1.4. Legalism Contra Anti-Legalism7

2. A Scientific Approach to the Contents of Legal Norms8

2.1. The Scholar and the Judge8

2.2. Legal Dogmatics and Social Sciences10

2.3. Legal Dogmatics and Legal Practice13

2.3.1. Normal Legal Practice14

2.3.2. Judicial Practice15

3. The Concept of Legal Dogmatics - A More Precise Formulation17

4. The Angle of Approach and the Basic Problems19

CHAPTER Ⅱ: THE ONTOLOGY OF LAW26

1. General Remarks26

2. The Ontology of Interpretation in Legal Dogmatics28

3. The Validity of a Legal Norm33

3.1. Wroblewski's Three Approaches33

3.2. Systematic Validity33

3.3. The Efficacy of Legal Norms38

3.4. The Acceptability of a Legal Norm43

CHAPTER Ⅲ: THE METHODOLOGY OF INTERPRETATION IN LEGAL DOGMATICS47

1. Basic Concepts47

1.1. Two Research Strategies47

1.2. A Norm Statement and an Interpretative Statement49

1.2.1. The Concept of the Norm Statement49

1.2.2. Conclusion55

1.2.3. A Meaning Statement and an Interpretation Statement56

1.2.4. A Norm Standpoint and an Interpretation Standpoint59

1.2.5. Summary60

1.3. The Concept of the Norm61

2. A General Characterization of Interpretation and Interpretation Theory67

2.1. Interpretation as a Hermeneutic Process67

2.2. The Special Nature of Interpretation in Legal Dogmatics72

3. The Sources of Law and the Directives of Legal Interpretation77

3.1. On the Concept of the Sources of Law77

3.1.1. The Source of Information77

3.1.2. The Source of Reasoning77

3.2. The List of the Sources of Law78

3.2.1. The Finnish Catalogue of the Sources78

3.2.2. General Remarks88

3.3. The Categorization of the Sources of Law89

3.3.1. The Bindingness of the Sources of Law89

3.3.2. Authoritative Reasons and Substantial Reasons92

3.4. Directives of Legal Interpretation95

3.4.1. The Order of Preference of the Sources of Law97

3.4.2. The Standards of the Reasoning Procedure101

4. Justification of the Interpretative Standpoint: Structural Analysis107

4.1. The Point of Departure: Disagreement on the Result of the Interpretation107

4.2. The Scope for Interpretation: Gaps and Conflicts in the Legal Order110

4.3. The Procedure of Discourse115

4.4. Internal and External Justification119

4.5. The Structure of the Ex-Justification Procedure120

4.6. An Example of the Justification Procedure122

4.6.1. Travaux Priparatoires123

4.6.2. Systemic Interpretation126

4.6.3. Court Decisions as Reasons128

4.6.4. On the Doctrinal Opinion129

4.6.5. Practical Reasons131

4.6.6. Summary134

4.7. The Relation Between the Systematization and the Interpretation of Legal Norms136

4.7.1. The Concept of Systematization136

4.7.2. An Example of Systematization: An Analysis of the Position of the Heir149

CHAPTER Ⅳ: THE ACCEPTABILITY OF AN INTERPRETATIVE STATEMENT158

1. The Principle of the One Right Answer158

1.1. A Terminological Clarification158

1.2. Examples of the Doctrines of the One Right Answer161

1.2.1. Ronald Dworkin's Theory161

1.2.2. Norm Statements as Norm Propositions166

1.2.2.1. Norm Statements as Predictions166

1.2.2.1.1. The Specific Nature of Legal Predictions166

1.2.2.1.2. On the Alf Ross' Predictive Theory170

1.2.2.2. Ilkka Niiniluoto's Approach174

1.2.2.3. Norm Propositions as Technical Norms180

1.2.2.3.1 General Remarks180

1.2.2.3.2 Secondary Technical Norms181

1.2.2.3.3 Primary Technical Norms182

2. Acceptability and Rationality185

2.1 The General Preconditions of the Justification of an Interpretative Standpoint185

2.2 The Concept of Rational Acceptability188

2.3 Why Be Rational?193

2.4 The General Conditions of Rational Discourse195

2.4.1 The Point of Departure195

2.4.2 The Basic Principles and Rules of D-Rationality196

2.4.2.1. Consistency-Rules196

2.4.2.2. Efficiency-Rules196

2.4.2.3. Sincerity-Rules197

2.4.2.4. Generalization-Rules198

2.4.2.5. Support-Rules198

2.4.3. The Rules of the Burden of Proof201

2.4.3.1. Procedural Rules of the Burden of Proof202

2.4.3.2. Material Rules of the Burden of Proof203

2.4.4 Summary203

2.5. Interpretations and Evaluations204

2.6. Knowledge, Certainty and Form of Life213

2.7. The Audience and the Form of Life221

2.7.1. Perelman's Theory of the Audience221

2.7.2. Some Clarifications222

2.7.2.1. The Concrete Audience222

2.7.2.2. The Ideal Audience224

2.7.3. Rational Acceptability as a Regulative Principle for Legal Dogmatics225

EPILOGUE230

NOTES237

ABBREVIATIONS260

BIBLIOGRAPHY261

INDEX272