《A THEOR OF LEGAL CENTENCES》

CHAPTER Ⅰ: MANDATORY NORMS: PRINCIPLES AND RULES1

1. Introduction. Types of principles1

1.1. The discussion about principles in contemporary legal theory: How it all started1

1.2. Different meanings of 'legal principle'3

1.3. A proposal of classification5

2. Principles and rules6

2.1. A structural approach to the distinction7

2.2. Principles and rules as reasons for action12

2.3. Principles, rules, powers, and interests15

3. The explanatory, the justificatory and the legitimatory dimension of principles19

3.1. Principles in legal explanations20

3.2. Principles in legal reasoning21

3.3. Principles, control and legitimation of power25

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER Ⅰ: REPLY TO OUR CRITICS26

1. Mandatory rules as peremptory reasons, and principles as non-peremptory reasons; the 'closed' or 'open' configuration of the conditions of application27

1.1. Prieto's critique27

1.2. Peczenik's critique34

2. Principles and full compliance36

2.1. Prieto's position37

2.2. Peczenik's position41

CHAPTER Ⅱ: POWER-CONFERRING RULES44

1. Introduction44

2. What power-conferring rules are not45

2.1. First exclusion: Power-conferring rules are not deontic or regulative norms46

2.2. Second exclusion: Power-conferring rules cannot adequately be understood in terms of definitions, conceptual rules, or qualifying dispositions53

3. What power-conferring rules are57

3.1. Three approaches and some ontological assumptions57

3.2. A structural approach58

3.3. A functional approach: Power-conferring rules as reasons for action65

3.4. Power-conferring rules, non-normative powers, and interests72

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER Ⅱ: REPLY TO OUR CRITICS76

1. Introduction76

2. Critique of our critique of the deontic (or prescriptivist) conception76

3. Are we treating the conceptualist thesis fairly?84

4. Problems with our conception85

CHAPTER Ⅲ: PERMISSIVE SENTENCES90

1. Permission in contemporary legal theory90

1.1. The pragmatic irrelevance of permissive norms. The category of 'permissive norms' is unnecessary. Echave-Urquijo-Guibourg (1980) and Ross (1968)91

1.2. Von Wright's proposal: Permissive norms as promises94

1.3. Weak and strong permission in Alchourron and Bulygin99

2. Reformulating the problem103

2.1. Permission and the regulation of 'natural' conduct103

2.2. Permission and the exercise of normative powers107

2.3. Permission and principles. Constitutional freedoms112

3. Some conclusions115

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER Ⅲ: A NOTE ON CONSTITUTIONAL PERMISSION AND BASIC RIGHTS116

CHAPTER Ⅳ: VALUES IN THE LAW120

1. Introduction120

2. Two conceptions of criminal norms121

3. The double-faced character of norms and value judgments127

4. Types of norms and types of values135

CHAPTER Ⅴ: THE RULE OF RECOGNITION141

1. Introduction141

2. Jurists and the 'normative value' of the constitution142

3. The rule of recognition as ultimate norm145

4. Changing the rule of recognition without rupturing legal continuity?146

5. A host of problems147

6. Who shapes the rule of recognition?148

7. The conceptual, directive and evaluative dimensions of the rule of recognition. The rule of recognition and the exclusionary claim of the law. Why accept the rule of recognition?152

8. How many rules of recognition? Certainty and penumbra in the rule of recognition158

CHAPTER Ⅵ: CONCLUSIONS162

1. Introduction162

2. A classification of legal sentences: Table 1162

3. A comparative analysis of the different types of sentences: Table 2164

TABLE Ⅰ. CLASSIFICATION OF SENTENCES175

TABLE Ⅱ. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF DIFFERENT TYPES OF SENTENCE176

BIBLIOGRAPHY183

INDEX OF NAMES191