《货币政策与理论 英文版》求取 ⇩

PART 1 FUNDAMENTALS OF MONETARY THEORY1

1 CURRENCY IN AN ISLAND ECONOMY2

1.1 Money and Barter2

1.2 Method of Analysis3

1.3 An Island Economy5

1.4 Autarky7

1.5 Barter under Bilateral Exchange with No Intermediate Trades8

1.6 Barter under Bilateral Exchange with Intermediate Trades12

1.7 Exchange with Commodity Money13

1.8 Exchange with Representative Commodity Money17

1.9 Exchange with Fiat Money19

1.10 Summary20

2 THE MONIES OF A MODERN ECONOMY25

2.1 The Monetary Aggregates26

2.2 Ml26

2.3 M231

2.4 M3 and L37

2.5 Units of Money39

2.6 Credit Card Transactions and Money40

2.7 Summary40

3 THE DEMAND FOR MONEY45

3.1 A Household's Transactions Demand for Money46

3.2 A Household's Precautionary Demand for Money49

3.3 The Demand for Money by Firms49

3.4 An Aggregate Money Demand Function50

3.5 Estimating the Demand fOr Money52

3.6 The Demand fOr Real Money Balances54

3.7 Velocity54

3.8 Secular Changes in the Demand for M156

3.9 The Velocity of M259

3.10 Other Velocity Measures62

3.11 Summary65

4 STOCK AND BOND VALUUAION AND THE TERM STRUCTURE OF INTEREST RATES70

4.1 Household Preferences and the Required Return to Savings71

4.2 The Fisher Equation74

4.3 Bond Valuation75

4.4 Stock Valuation77

4.5 Bond Stock and Price Fluctuation79

4.6 The Term Structure of Interest Rates: The Pure Expectations Hypothesis80

4.7 The Yield Curve82

4.8 The Liquidity Premium83

4.9 Interpreting the Slope of the Yield Curve85

4.10 Summary86

PART II FUNDAMENTALS OF MONETARY AND FINANClAL INSTITUTIONS89

5 FiNANCIAL INTERMEDiATION90

5.1 Financial Intermediation in an Island Economy91

5.2 FinancialIntermediation and the Matching of Intertemporal Preferences91

5.3 Risk Assessment, Agency Costs, and Uncertain Investment Projects95

5.4 Financial Intermediation and Risk-Reduction through Diversification98

5.5 Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring99

5.6 Summary101

6 FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS105

6.1 Financial Intermediation in Stocks and Bonds106

6.2 The Financial Intermediation of Depository Institutions108

6.3 Mutual versus Stock-Based Ownership of Depository Institutions111

6.4 Depository Institutions in the United States112

6.5 A Closer Look at Commercial Banking112

7 THE MONEY SUPPLY PROCESS113

6.6 Loan Default Risk, Deposit Insurance, and Capital Requirements118

6.7 Summary120

7.1 Reserve Aggregates124

7.2 The Federal Reserve's Balance Sheet127

7.3 Open Market Operations129

7.4 The Relationship betWeen Open Market Operations and Total Bank Reserves131

7.5 Multiple Deposit Creation: A Simple Example133

7.6 Reserve Aggregate Multipliers136

7.7 Money Multipliers137

7.8 The Sources of Imperfect Monetary Control139

7.9 Endogenous Money Supply140

7.10 Summary140

8 INSTITUTIONS OF MONETARY CONTROL: HISTORICAL ROLE OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE IN THE UNITED STATES144

8.1 The Problem of an Inelastic Money Supply145

8.2 Endogenous Money Supply147

8.3 Unintended Consequences of Open Market Operations, 1917-1921149

8.4 The Centralization of Monetary Policy Decision Making, 1921-1935151

8.5 The Gold Purchase Program and Treasury Department Dominance, 1933--1937155

8.6 Unintended Consequences of Reserve Requirement Changes,1937-1938157

8.7 World War II and the U.S. Government Bond Price Support Program, 1939-1945158

8.8 The Treasury--Federal Reserve Accord: Truce and Settlement, 1945-1952159

8.9 The Collapse of the Bretton Woods Agreements, 1952--1973160

8.10 Post-Bretton Woods and the Humphrey-Hawkins Full-Employment Act162

8.11 Summary164

PART III EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS169

9 "FULL ENPLOYNENT" AND MONETARY POLICY NEUTRALITY170

9.1 Modeling the Economy as a Collection of Aggregate Markets171

9.2 The Principal Economic Agents and Their Roles in Determining Equilibrium172

9.3 Household Preferences174

9.4 The Consumption/Savings Decision177

9.5 The Portfolio Allocation Decision178

9.6 The Labor/Leisure Decision180

9.7 Technology of the Goods-Producing Firms182

9.8 The Production and Labor Demand Decision184

9.9 The Investment and Bond Supply Decision185

9.10 The Government's Money Supply Decision188

9.11 General Equilibrium189

9.12 "Full Employment"192

9.13 Monetary Policy Neutrality193

9. 14 Summary196

10 ECONOMIC FLUCTUATIONS AND MONETARY ACCOMMODATION199

10.1 Total Factor Productivity Shocks201

10.2 The Response of Firms to a Positive Productivity Shock203

10.3 The Response of Households to a Positive Productivity Shock204

10.4 The Determination of Nominal Wages205

10.5 Equilibrium Analysis of a Positive Productivity Shock without Monetary Accommodation206

10.6 Equilibrium Analysis of a Positive Productivity Shock with Monetary Accommodation207

10.7 Preference Shocks210

10.8 Intratemporal Preference Shocks211

10.9 Intertemporal Preference Shocks213

10.10 Summary216

11 STABILIZATION POLICY WHEN FIRMS SET PRICES IN ADVANCE219

11.1 Price Setting by Firms220

11.2 Liquidity-Constrained HousehOlds222

11.3 Equilibrium Response without Monetary Accommodation in the Absence of Preference Shocks224

11.4 Equilibrium Response with Monetary Accommodation in the Absence of Preference Shocks227

11.5 Monetary Policy and the Signal Extraction Problem229

11.6 Equilibrium Response with Monetary Accommodation in the Presence of an Intratemporal Preference Shock230

11.7 Equilibrium Response with Monetary Accommodation in the Presence of an Intertemporal Preference Shock236

11.8 Summary239

12 STABILIZATION POLICY IN THE PRESENCE OF LONGTERM NOMINAL WAGE CONTRACTS244

12.1 A Keynesian Labor Market246

12.2 Response of the Economy to a Productivity Shock When Nominal Wages Are Set in Advance and When There Is No Attempt at Monetary Accommodation248

12.3 Response of the Economy to a Positive Shock When Nominal Wages Are Set in Advance and There Is an Attempt at Monetary Accommodation251

12.4 Is the Full-Employment Objective of Stabilization Policy Inappropriate When Preference Shocks Are Long-lived?256

12.5 Response of the Economy to a Long-Lived Intratemporal Preference Shock When Nominal Wages Are Set in Advance257

12.6 Response of the Economy to a Long-Lived Intertemporal Preference Shock When Nominal Wages Are Set in Advance265

12.7 Summary270

PART IV DESCRIPTlVE DYN MICS AND INFLATION275

13 A CRITIQUE OF STABILIZATION POLICY276

13.1 A Monetarist Critique of Stabilization Policy277

13.2 Time Lags and Macroeconomic Dynamics279

13.3 Recognition Lag280

13.4 Policy Design and Implementation Lags281

13.5 The Dynamic Response of the Economy to a Change in Monetary Policy282

13.6 Sluggish Prices283

13.7 Long and Variable Lags285

13.8 Stabilization Policy in Practice289

13.9 Summary291

14 MONETARY RULES294

14.1 Long-Run PoliCy Objectives294

14.2 Policy Design: The Constant Growth Rate (CGR) Rule297

14.3 Long-Run Structural Changes and the CGR Rule300

14.4 Financial Instability and the CGR Rule301

14.5 Long-Run Consequences of an Active Stabilization Policy303

14.6 Summary306

15 INFWION AND SEIGNIORAGE: WHAT IS OPTIMAL?310

15.1 Inflation Taxes in the Island Economy310

15.2 Price Level Stability313

15.3 Labor Market Rigidities and Moderate Inflation315

15.4 Seigniorage316

15.5 Summary319

PART V THE MECHANICS OF POLICY AND POLICY-MAKING323

16 OPTIMAL TARGETING AND THE RESPONSE OF FINANCIAL MARKETS324

16.1 Stabilization Policy and the Choice of an Intermediate Target325

16.2 Policy Instruments and Policy Tools331

16.3 The Federal Funds Market332

16.4 Discount Rate Po1icy335

16.5 Monetary Target Cones and "Base Drift"337

16.6 Monetary Aggregate Targeting and the Response of the Financial Markets to the Weekly Money Supply Announcements339

16.7 Less than Complete Monetary Aggregate Targeting and the Response of the Financial Markets to Other Macroeconomic News that Could Alter Monetary Policy341

16.8 The Transition Back to Federal Funds Rate Targeting343

16.9 Summary344

17 DESK OPERATIONS AND THE KEPO MARKET FOR TREASURIES348

17.1 The Repurchase Agreement349

17.2 The Federal Reserve's Book Entry System for Treasury Securities350

17.3 Dealer Financing in the RP Market and DVP Transfers on the Securities Wire352

17.4 RPs with the Federal Reserve and Their Connection with the Federal Funds Market354

17.5 Arbitrage of the RP Rate and the Federal Funds Rate355

17.6 The Mix of Outright Purchases, RPs, and MSPs356

17.7 Summary359

18 TIME INCONSISTENCY AND THE CREDIBILITY OF MONETARY POLlCY362

18.1 Time Inconsistency in Monetary Policy364

18.2 Rules versus Discretion367

18.3 Reputation-Building and Discretionary Policy371

18.4 Is There an Optimal Contract for the Policy Maker?373

18.5 Summary374