《INTELLIGENCE POLICY AND NATIONAL SECURITY》求取 ⇩

PART ONE OVERVIEW: WHAT HAS BEEN LEARNED? 1

1. Intelligence and Deception Reginald V. Jones3

2. Slow Pearl Harbours and the Pleasures of Deception Roberta Wohlstetter23

PART TWO INTELLIGENCE: CONCEPTUAL APPROACHES35

3. Approaches to Intelligence and Social Science37

PART THREE PROBLEMS OF EVALUATION: THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES47

4. The Soviet Military Potential for Surprise Attack: Surprise, Superiority and Time John Erickson49

5. American Perceptions and Misperceptions of Soviet Military Intentions and Capabilities Richard Pipes74

6. 'Static' and 'Dynamic' Intelligence Perceptions: The Soviet Union - Problems of Analysis and Evaluation Uri Ra'anan82

7. Deception and Surprise' Problems of Analysts and Analysis William E. 91

8. United States and Soviet Strategic Technologies and Nuclear War Fighting: A Comparison Patrick J. Friel98

PART FOUR INTELLIGENCE AND VERIFICATION:THE CASE OF SALT II129

9. Verification Jasper A. Welch131

10. Verification and SALT: A Different Line of Insight Amrom Katz143

11. SALT II' Who Is Deceiving Whom?Richard Perle148

12. The Adequacy of SALT Verification Albert Carnesale157

PART FIVE SURPRISE: THE TECHNOLOGICAL FACTORS161

13. Technology and Lead Time: Soviet Experimental TechnoiogyClarcnce A. Robinson. Jr.163

14. ASAT: At tlomc and Abroad Edgar Ulsamer175

15. Technical Feasibility of Directed Energy Weapons in Strategic Defence Patrick J. Friel179

PART SIX SURPRISE: POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS185

16. Surprise in Diplomacy Michael I. Handel187

17. Soviet Bloc 'Disinformation' and Other 'Active Measures' Ladislav Biltman212

PART SEVEN INTELLIGENCE: THE ECONOMIC FACTOR229

18. Intelligence: The Economic Factor Richard Mancke231

PART EIGHT INTELLIGENCE MANAGEMENT243

19. American Strategic Intelligence: Politics, Priorities and Direction Richard K. Betts245

20. Intelligence Problems as Viewed from The White House268

21. United States Intelligence Activities: The Role of Congress273

22. The Role of Congress in the Intelligence Evaluation Process289

PART NINE CONCLUSIONS295

23. Intelligence, Deception and Surprise: Implications for United States Policy in the 1980s297

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