《JUDGING TOWARDS A RATIONAL JUDICIAL PROCESS》

Chapter 1. Democracy and Positivism1

1.1 Popper's Approach1

1.2 Positivism and Pragmatism4

1.3 Hard Theories and Hard Cases9

1.3.1 Introduction9

1.3.2 Dworkin's Suppositions9

1.3.3 Standards11

1.3.4 The Rights Thesis12

1.3.5 Discretion14

1.3.6 The Is and the Ought16

1.3.7 The Role of Standards17

1.3.8 Court Rhetoric20

1.3.9 Conclusion21

1.4 Standards: A Category-Mistake21

1.5 Two Main Questions Relating to Law23

Chapter 2. A Question of Confidence26

2.1 Legal Realism and Legal Certainty26

2.1.1 Introduction26

2.1.2 The Movement up to the Present27

2.1.3 Away with Legal Certainty31

2.1.4 Elements of the Judicial Decision-Making Process32

2.1.4.1 Attitudes of the Judges32

2.1.4.2 More Elements34

2.1.4.3 Within the Tides35

2.1.4.4 The Quest for Acceptability37

2.1.5 Conclusion38

2.2 Equality, Justice and Freedom39

Chapter 3. A Question of Concern44

3.1 The Bench at the Bar of Politics44

3.2 Preservation of the Judiciary in the EEC46

3.2.1 Introduction46

3.2.2 In Praise of Democracy47

3.2.3 Problematic Prospects49

3.2.4 The Role of the Courts51

3.2.5 Judicial Activism54

3.2.6 More Help to Brothers in Law56

3.2.7 Some Suggestions58

3.2.8 Conclusion60

Chapter 4. A Different Viewpoint62

4.1 An Inventory of the Judge's Equipment62

4.2 Summary of 'A Plea for the President'65

4.3 A Plea for the President66

4.3.1 Growing Gossip66

4.3.2 Summary Proceedings and Payment of Damages69

4.3.3 Assessment of Damages72

4.3.4 Conclusion74

4.3.5 Against Judicial Interventionism75

Chapter 5. Discretion76

5.1 Legal Limitations to Discretion76

5.2 Summary of 'Courts and Corporations'78

5.3 Courts and Corporations80

5.3.1 Introduction80

5.3.2 The Holy Chair81

5.3.3 The Minister's Argumentation82

5.3.4 Accountable Courts83

5.3.5 Judicial Intervention in the Company's Policy84

5.3.6 The Policy of the Board of Management87

5.3.7 The Disastrous Results of Judicial Decisions88

5.3.8 The Policy of the Courts88

5.3.9 The Policy of the Enterprise Chamber89

5.3.10 Non-Legal Limitations to Judicial Discretion91

5.3.11 Conclusion92

5.4 Psychological and Moral Limitations to Discretion92

Chapter 6. Logic and 'New' Rhetoric97

6.1 Life of Law is Experience, Not Logic97

6.2 Legal Reasoning at Bar99

6.2.1 Introduction99

6.2.2 A Classification of Zetetic Reasoning99

6.2.3 The Judge101

6.2.4 The Advocate104

6.2.5 Conclusion107

6.3 A Logical Scrutiny of the Van Duyn Case107

6.3.1 Introduction107

6.3.2 An Outline of the Counter-Formula Decision Procedure109

6.3.3 The Facts of the Van Duyn Case111

6.3.4 First Question112

6.3.5 Second Question115

6.3.6 Third Question122

6.3.7 Conclusion128

6.4 A Complementary Scrutiny of the Van Duyn Case129

Epilogue133

Summary135

Zusammenfassung137

Samenvatting139

Bibliography141

Notes149

Index of Names173

Index of Subjects176