《STRATEGIC THREATS AND NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSES DEFENDING THE U.S.HOMELAND》

Chapter 1. Homeland Defense: The Threat of Direct Attacks with Long-Range Missiles and Weapons of Mass Destruction1

Issues versus Partisanship9

The Uncertain Heritage of the Clinton NMD Acquisition and Deployment Program13

Chapter 2. Threat Assessment and Prioritization17

Uncertainty and Warning23

Existing Nuclear Threats26

Russia, NMD, and START II/III33

The Russian Perspective Toward a U.S. NMD System and Nuclear Force Modernization46

Russian Force Modernization versus the Current U.S. NMD Architecture50

The Problem of the ABM Treaty51

Linking NMD to Changes in the ABM Treaty54

U.S. Views on a Possible Deal with Russia62

Impact on President Clinton's Decision to Delay Deployment84

Russian Capability to Increase the Nuclear Threat to the U.S.87

Making a Russian Compromise Work: The Problem of Russian Goals and Perceptions93

Chinese Strategic Force Deployments94

Potential Sources of Chinese and U.S. Confrontation103

Chinese versus Russian Attitudes toward a U.S. NMD System106

Chinese and Russian Cooperation in Opposing NMD107

The Impact of Chinese Nuclear Modernization109

Assessing the Chinese Reaction to NMD115

The Problem of Proliferation116

North Korea Force Development120

North Korea and Nuclear Weapons120

North Korea and Long-Range Missiles122

North Korea's Uncertain Public Profile in Proliferation130

North Korea and SLV Development138

The Impact of North and South Korea Rapprochement and the New Kim Jong-Il139

Is North Korea a Continuing Threat?142

Iranian Force Developments144

The Problem of Iranian "Moderation" and Intentions144

Iranian Missile Developments145

Iranian Warheads and Penetration Aids146

U.S. Assessment of Iranian Long-Range Missile Developments147

Iran and Weapons of Mass Destruction149

Iran and the Justification for NMD154

Iraqi Force Developments154

U.S. Assessments of Iraqi Capabilities155

Iraqi Post-Sanctions Capabilities and Iraqi Intentions160

"Nth" Country Missile Threats and the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle161

Other Types of Threats to the United States163

The Hierarchy of Missile Threats and the Need for a Balanced U.S. Response174

Chapter 3. The History of the Modern U.S. National Missile Defense Program183

The SDIO Era184

The Impact of BMDO187

The Acquisition Phase of NMD Activity192

The NMD Program Before President Clinton's Decision to Defer Deployment197

The Total Cost of the U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense Program202

The Clinton Administration's Last Description of Its Missile Defense Efforts205

BMDO Enters the Bush Era: Everything Old Is New Again209

The Lessons of History212

Chapter 4. The Changing Architecture of the U.S. National Missile Defense Program215

The NMD Architecture Developed Under the Clinton Administration216

The Ground-Based Interceptor (GBI)216

The X-Band Radar(s) (XBR)219

Upgraded Early-Warning Radars (UEWR)219

The Battle Management/Command, Control, and Communications (BM/C3) System220

The Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS)221

Is the Proposed System Truly National? Location, Range, and Coverage226

Chapter 5. Risk, Cost, and Benefits229

Generalizations versus Program Specifics229

Independent U.S. Government Efforts to Assess Risk, Cost, and Benefits: The GAO Study232

Independent U.S. Government Efforts to Assess Risk, Cost, and Benefits: The Report of the "Welch Panel"235

The Welch Panel and Problems in Test and Evaluation Efforts236

The June 2000 Welch Panel Report and the Department of Defense Response237

Independent U.S. Government Efforts to Assess Risk, Cost, and Benefits: Tests in 1999 and 2000 and the Report of the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation240

BMDO Defenses and Warnings About the Test and Evaluation Program259

The BMDO Overview of the Test Program259

The Year 2000 Test Program263

The July 2000 Test Failure265

BMDO Overview of the 2001 Test Program272

Success and Evolution in 2001275

Independent U.S. Government Efforts to Assess Risk, Cost, and Benefits: The CBO Report on Budgetary Implications of National Missile Defense289

The Details of the CBO Cost Estimate291

The CBO Analysis of Technical Risks and Test and Evaluation299

Technical Risks and Test and Evaluation: The Problem of Countermeasures303

The Union of Concerned Scientists and MIT Security Studies Program View of Countermeasures304

Postol's and Other Comments About Countermeasures306

The BMDO and the Department of Defense Rebuttals307

Other Technical Objections to the Current NMD System312

Efforts to Assess Risk, Cost, and Benefits: Summary Conclusions313

Chapter 6. The Deployment and Non-deployment Schedule for the NMD317

Risk, Deployment Decisions, Congress, and King Canute317

Secretary Cohen Shifts Deployment Targets325

Clinton Decides to Defer Deployment327

The Bush Inheritance329

Chapter 7. Looking Beyond the Current System and Deployment Plan331

The Advanced Technology Program332

Alternative Approaches to the Present NMD Architecture338

The Need for Net Technology Assessment342

Chapter 8. The Role of Other Nations in Ballistic Missile Defense345

Europe, NATO, Asia, and the Arab States349

Israel355

The Tactical High Energy Laser (THEL)356

The Patriot and PAC-3358

The Arrow358

The Integrated Boost-Phase Intercept System and Moab361

Warning and Command and Control362

The Interoperable Defense Effort: Israeli and U.S. Cooperation363

The Complex Structure of the Full Israeli Missile Defense Program364

Seeking Allied Tolerance Rather than Cooperation366

Chapter 9. Conclusions and Future Options369

Deploying a National Missile Defense System and the "Delicate Balance of Deterrence"370

Reconsidering the Options for Deploying a National Missile Defense System372

Meeting the Strategic and Technical Requirements for Deploying a National Missile Defense System373

Politicizing NMD into Failure375

A Risk-Prone Test and Evaluation Program376

Deferral Was the Right Decision, but It Is Far from an Adequate Approach376

The Minimum Next Step: Shifting to a Success-Driven Approach377

The Leadership and Program the Nation Needs378

No Deployment Option Can Make All Levels of Strategic Competition Go Away381

Notes383